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Background/Aim. The ability to comprehend and pro-
duce irony and deception is rarely explored in people with 
intellectual disability (ID) or dual diagnoses (DD). The abil-
ity to understand irony and deception appears to be related 
to many cognitive skills, but some authors point out that the 
theory of mind is one of the most important factors for this 
ability. This research was conducted to determine the lin-
guistic aspects of production and comprehension of irony 
and deception in adults with ID and DD, as well as the rela-
tionship of these abilities with theory of mind. Methods. 
The sample consisted of 120 people with ID aged between 
20 and 56. Half of the sample comprised people with DD. 
Four subscales from the Assessment Battery for Communi-
cation were used to assess the participants’ abilities to pro-
duce and comprehend irony and deception. False-belief 
tasks from “appearance-reality” category were used in the-
ory of mind assessment. The level of intellectual functioning 
was measured by the Raven’s progressive matrices, while 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test was used to assess 
speech comprehension ability. Results. The results show 
that participants with DD and ID comprehend and produce 
false statements better than ironic ones. Participants with 
ID were more successful in production than in comprehen-
sion tasks of both false and ironic statements, while the 
same was true for participants with DD only for ironic 
statements. Participants with ID were significantly more 
successful than participants with DD in irony comprehen-
sion tasks. In participants with ID, first-order theory of 
mind significantly correlated only with the ability to produce 
irony, and second-order theory of mind significantly corre-
lated with producing irony and deception. There were no 
significant correlations between theory of mind and produc-
ing and comprehending irony and deception in participants 
with DD. Conclusion. Although differences in some as-
pects of assessed abilities were found between the two 
groups of participants, the similarities in the profile of these 
abilities were dominant. Results of variability can be ex-
plained by differences in speech comprehension ability 
more than by differences in nonverbal intellectual function-
ing or theory of mind acquisition. Future studies should as-
sess the influence of other cognitive factors. 
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Uvod/Cilj. Sposobnost razumevanja i produkcije ironije i 
prevare je retko izučavana u populaciji osoba sa intelektual-
nom ometenošću (IO) ili dualnim dijagnozama (DD). Spo-
sobnost razumevanja ironije i prevare se dovodi u vezu sa 
mnogim kognitivnim veštinama, ali neki autori ističu da je 
upravo teorija uma jedan od najznačajnijih faktora za ovu 
sposobnost. Ovo istraživanje je sprovedeno radi utvrđivanja 
lingvističke sposobnosti razumevanja i produkcije ironije i 
prevare odraslih osoba sa IO i DD, kao i utvrđivanja odno-
sa između ovih sposobnosti i teorije uma. Metode. Uzorak 
je činilo 120 osoba sa IO starosne dobi između 20 i 56 go-
dina. Polovinu uzorka činile su osobe sa DD. Za procenu 
ispitanikovih sposobnosti produkcije i razumevanja ironije i 
prevare korišćene su četiri supskale iz Baterije za procenu 
komunikacije. Za procenu teorije uma korišćeni su zadaci 
lažnog verovanja iz kategorije „izgled-realnost“. Nivo inte-
lektualnog funkcionisanja proveravan je Ravenovim progre-
sivnim matricama, dok je sposobnost razumevanja govora 
procenjivana Peabody Picture Vocabulary testom. Rezultati. 
Rezultati pokazuju da ispitanici sa IO i DD bolje razumeju i 
produkuju lažne nego ironične iskaze. Ispitanici sa IO su 
uspešniji u zadacima produkovanja, nego u zadacima razu-
mevanja, kako lažnih, tako i ironičnih iskaza, dok za ispita-
nike sa DD ovo važi samo za ironične tvrdnje. U zadacima 
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razumevanja ironije, ispitanici sa IO su bili značajno uspeš-
niji od ispitanika sa DD. Kod ispitanika sa IO teorija uma 
prvog reda ostvarila je značajne korelacije samo sa sposob-
nošću produkcije ironije, a teorija uma drugog reda sa pro-
dukcijom ironije i produkcijom prevare. U grupi ispitanika 
sa DD nisu ustanovljene značajne korelacije između teorije 
uma i produkcije i razumevanja ironije i prevare. Zaključak. 
Između dve grupe ispitanika pronađene su razlike u nekim 
aspektima ispitivanih sposobnosti, ali ipak dominiraju slič-
nosti u profilu ovih sposobosti. Varijabilnost rezultata više 
objašnjava razlike u sposobnosti razumevanja govora, nego 
razlike u neverbalnom intelektualnom funkcionisanju ili us-
vojenosti teorije uma. Narednim istraživanjima trebalo bi 
proveriti uticaj drugih kognitivnih faktora. 
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The ability to comprehend irony should be considered 
in terms of the knowledge and context shared by two inter-
locutors (i.e., one interlocutor understands that the meaning 
of the other interlocutor’s spoken message is in contrast to 
the background and context of the message) 1. By uttering 
ironic contents, the speaker produces a message that is not 
true and is contrary to the truth, but has no desire to deceive 
or trick the interlocutor 2. 
When the speaker intends to influence the interlocutor’s 
mental state, i.e., to manipulate his/her mental state, we refer 
to deception. In situations involving deception, the speaker 
knows that what he/she is saying is a lie but tries to convince 
the interlocutor that it is true. By uttering a lie, the speaker 
conveys a message he/she knows is a lie 3–4. 
Detecting the literal meaning of a statement represents 
only the first step in discovering and comprehending the in-
terlocutor’s communicative intentions. Bara 5 points out the 
importance of understanding the interlocutor's mental states 
in realizing and comprehending a communication act. For 
communication to be successful, the interlocutor should re-
construct the speaker’s mental state, search for the speaker’s 
communicative intention, attribute certain mental states to 
the speaker with the possibility to change them, form his 
own communicative intentions and reply to the speaker 5–6. 
That is the reason the theory of mind (TOM) ability is 
singled out as significant cognitive factor for this ability 4. 
However, the exact role of the theory of mind in pragmatic 
aspects of communication has not yet been fully explored, 
both in typical participants 7, and those with psychiatric dis-
orders 8–9. Theory of mind (mentalization) represents the 
ability to understand and attribute different mental states to 
oneself and others, and as such is associated with communi-
cation in which the interlocutors convey messages with an 
intention, with the possibility to persuade the interlocutor, or 
deliberately deceive him/her, by sharing mutual attention, 
mutual plans, and goals of behaviour 10. 
According to some authors, first-order theory of mind 
(the ability to understand personal mental states) correlates 
with the comprehension of metaphor 11, and second-order 
theory of mind (a phenomenon that a person has a belief 
about the belief of another person) correlates with the com-
prehension of irony 11–13. On the other hand, some authors 
have not found significant correlation between theory of 
mind and irony comprehension 14. 
In previous years, the ability to comprehend and pro-
duce irony and deception has been studied in children and 
adults with average intellectual abilities 4, 15–22, but also in 
persons with traumatic brain injuries 23, autism 24, schizo-
phrenia 14, Parkinson's disease 13, cerebral palsy 25, attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 26. 
By analysing the literature, we determined that the 
abilities to comprehend and produce irony and deception 
have almost never been studied in people with intellectual 
disability (ID) or those with dual diagnoses (DD) i.e., people 
who have ID and a comorbid psychiatric disorder). ID repre-
sents a condition which occurs before the age of 18, and 
which is characterized by significant limitations in intellec-
tual and adaptive functioning. Limitations in adaptive func-
tioning include the deficits in conceptual, social, and practi-
cal skills 27. Insufficiently mastered conceptual and social 
skills in persons with ID hinder, among other things, the 
identification and comprehension of relevant social signals, 
their integration and processing, and thus planning and reali-
zation of behaviour in accordance with the existing situa-
tion 28. With regard to that, persons with ID can, to a greater 
or lesser extent, express difficulties in different aspects of 
functional communication and pragmatic abilities 29.  
ID is often accompanied by comorbid psychiatric disor-
ders 30–32. The prevalence of these disorders ranges from 14% 
to 70% 33–36, and such a wide range of the obtained results is 
attributed to methodological characteristics of different stud-
ies 37–38. It is believed that the presence of psychiatric symp-
toms has a negative effect on everyday functioning of per-
sons with ID more than that is the case in persons with aver-
age intellectual abilities 31.  
Studies that aimed to assess general linguistic aspects of 
production and comprehension in participants with DD indi-
cate that these people express disorganized linguistic produc-
tion, which is characterized by unclear and poor speech ex-
pression, confusion, discomfort and frustration caused by the 
interlocutor’s poor comprehension, and noticeably reduced 
or absent initiative in conversation 39–41. The conversation of 
persons with DD can be described as aimless, disorganized, 
incoherent, and poor 42–43. 
In addition, previous studies have shown theory of mind 
to be substantially delayed in people with ID. Several authors 
indicate that people with ID do not exhibit a theory of mind 
deficit relative to typically developing people of the same 
mental age 44–45, while the others reveal significant impair-
ments, especially in people with specific aetiologies 46–47. 
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There are also many studies examining alterations of theory 
of mind in patients with schizophrenia and average intellec-
tual abilities 48–51, but no one investigated the ability of the-
ory of mind in people with DD. 
The aim of this research is to investigate the linguistic 
abilities to produce and comprehend irony and deception in 
adults with ID with regard to the level of ID and the presence 
or absence of DD. Additionally, the relationship between 
theory of mind ability and the ability to produce and com-
prehend irony and deception was tested. 
Methods 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 120 participants of both gen-
ders. The complete sample was divided into ID and DD sub-
samples, with 60 participants in each subsample. The exclu-
sion criteria for both groups were severe visual and hearing 
impairment, bilingualism, autism spectrum disorder and 
brain injury. 
The groups did not differ significantly in terms of age 
(t[118] = 1.42, p = 0.158). 
Data on gender, age, speech comprehension ability, and 
intellectual functioning are presented in Table 1. 
The participants with ID were those with below average 
intellectual and adaptive functioning of unknown aetiology. No 
comorbid psychiatric disorders were detected in their clinical 
presentations, and thus these participants did not use medica-
tions. 
In participants with DD, comorbid psychiatric disorders 
were diagnosed along with below average intellectual and 
adaptive functioning, and they were all classified as schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorders according to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) classifica-
tion 52. Because of the existing psychiatric disorder, the par-
ticipants with DD used antipsychotics, and their medical 
charts included information on occasional hospitalization in 
psychiatric institutions, while their below average intellec-
tual functioning had no known cause. 
All of the participants were diagnosed in childhood, and 
repeated diagnosis and obligatory psychiatric assessments 
were conducted upon the participants’ admission to a social 
care institution. Data on the dual diagnoses were taken from 
the participants’ personal records. Raven’s progressive ma-
trices were used to determine the level of intellectual func-
tioning. Independent samples t-test was used to compare 
scores on Raven’s progressive matrices in participants with ID 
and DD, and the obtained results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant differences (t[118] = 1.20, p = 0.232). 
Speech comprehension ability was assessed using the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. Both groups of partici-
pants were compared using independent samples t-tests, and 
the results showed that speech comprehension ability was 
more developed in the participants with ID than in the par-
ticipants with DD (t[118] = 2.13, p = 0.035). 
Bearing in mind the importance of language abilities for 
understanding irony 53 and deception 54, as well as for theory 
of mind 55, speech comprehension ability was used as the co-
variate in this research. Apart from speech comprehension 
ability, the score on Raven’s progressive matrices was also 
used as the covariate.  
Measures 
The abilities to comprehend and produce irony and de-
ception were assessed using four subscales from The As-
sessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo) 6, a clinical 
instrument for evaluating pragmatic abilities. The ABaCo 
was translated in full from Italian into Serbian using the 
“double-blind translation” method. The video tasks were 
synchronized by male and female synchronizers. The instru-
ment has five scales: Linguistic scale (e.g. the examiner asks 
the subject “Tell me that you are cold”), Extralinguistic scale 
(e.g. the examiner asks the subject “Order me to be quite”, 
the subject has to produce gestural acts), Paralinguistic scale 
(e.g., saying “I like it very much” while one’s voice and atti-
tude reveal that one doesn’t like it at all), Context scale (the 
actor asks “Where are you going precisely?” and the partner 
replies “I’m going out”; the subject has to detect and explain 
the adequacy/inadequacy of the partner's reply), and Conver-
sational scale (which assesses participants’ ability to get in-
volved in conversation, answer questions, respect the given 
topic, introduce new topics and speak when it is their turn). 
Within each scale, except the Conversational scale, the tasks 
were grouped into two subcategories – for the assessment of 
comprehension abilities and for the assessment of production 
abilities. There were 172 items in total, where 100 items were 
presented as video clips and 72 items were direct items in which 
the examiner asked questions and the participant was his inter-
locutor. In video tasks, the examiner showed a video clip and 
then asked questions related to communicative interaction pre-
sented in it. Video clips were 20 to 25 seconds long, and the 
number of words uttered in them ranged between five and nine. 
Each correct answer was marked with 1, and incorrect with 0. 
Maximum number of points in one task differed with regard to 
the scale it belonged to and the type of the task itself.  
 
Table 1  
The participants’ characteristics 
Gender Age (years) Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Raven’s progressive matricesSubsamples n 
F M min max mean SD min max mean SD min max mean SD 
ID 60 30 30 20 55 32.95 8.333 10 176 95.22 44.394 6 35 13.73 4.974
DD  60 30 30 20 56 30.70 8.494 9 159 78.12 43.379 4 24 12.73 4.104
ID – intellectual disability; DD – dual diagnoses; n – number of participants; F – female; M – male; SD – standard deviation. 
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According to the authors 6 of the scale, the whole bat-
tery has high internal consistency which ranges from α = 
0.63 to α = 0.91; the authors 6 of the scale also point out that 
the agreement among the evaluators was high and that it 
ranged from 0.76 to 0.96. 
Only the following subscales from the entire ABaCo 
battery were used for the purpose of this research: The Sub-
scale of Linguistic Comprehension of Irony (hereinafter 
Comprehension of Irony), The Subscale of Linguistic Com-
prehension of Deception (hereinafter Comprehension of De-
ception), The Subscale of Linguistic Production of Irony (he-
reinafter Production of Irony), The Subscale of Linguistic 
Production of Deception (hereinafter Production of Decep-
tion). Although irony and deception have both linguistic and 
non-linguistic aspects, the given subscales assessed only lin-
guistic aspects. 
Each of the four subscales consists of four video tasks, 
all of which are graded on three levels. A participant can ob-
tain a maximum of 12 points for each subscale. The men-
tioned levels within the production tasks include the follow-
ing: 1. whether the participant expressed (formulated) a mes-
sage, 2. whether the message was clear, understandable and 
acceptable, and 3. whether the message was sent with a spe-
cific purpose. On the other hand, the following items are eva-
luated in tasks which assess comprehension: 1) whether the 
participant understood what the actor in the video said, 2) 
whether the participant understood the truthfulness of that 
statement (is it a lie or the truth), and 3) whether the partici-
pant understood the purpose of that message (what was the 
person's intention when he said that).  
For the tasks from Comprehension of Irony, after 
watching a video depicting a two-way communication inter-
action in which one actor utters an ironic statement (e.g. A 
girl in the shop tries on a dress that is obviously too tight. 
She asks her boyfriend whether a dress fits and he replies 
“It’s a bit wide”), the participants are directed to answer the 
following questions: “What did the actor want to say? Did he 
really say that? Why did he answer in that way?”  
Tasks from Comprehension of Deception include video 
scenes in which one actor gives a false reply to deceive the 
interlocutor (e.g. A boy and a girl sit at a table in a reading 
room. The girl gets up and leaves the room. He accidentally 
pours coffee over her notes. The girl comes back and asks: 
"Who has spilled coffee on my notes?" and the boy answers: 
“I really do not have a clue”). On the basis of what they see 
and hear, the participants are directed to answer the follow-
ing questions: “What did the actor want to say? Did he tell 
the truth? Why did he say that?” 
Tasks from Production of Irony include a video that 
presents a communicative interaction in which one actor says 
something, and the participants are expected to formulate an 
ironic answer for the second actor that completes the conver-
sation (e.g. A girl is studying a radio that is on the table. A 
young man enters the room, leans on the table and observes 
an unplugged cable. The girl says desperately: “I don’t know 
why the radio does not work”). The following aspects are as-
sessed in this task: whether the participant formulated the 
message, whether the message is clear and understandable, 
and whether the participant said it to make a joke, amuse 
somebody, or achieve the effect of irony. 
In Production of Deception, the participants are ex-
pected to complete a chain of communication by formulating 
and producing an answer to deceive the interlocutor on the 
basis of the video presented (e.g. A young man enters a 
room, spots a bottle of juice, drinks it and throws the empty 
bottle in the bin. Straight after a girls enters the room and 
asks: “What has happened with my juice?”). The partici-
pant’s answers to these tasks are graded on three levels: 
whether the participant formulated the message, whether the 
message is clear and understandable, and whether the par-
ticipant lied to deceive somebody, i.e., so that the participant 
was not revealed. 
False-belief tasks, the ones from the category of “ap-
pearance-reality” or “deceiving object” tasks, were used to 
assess the theory of mind ability 56, 57. The original task as-
sesses the participants’ ability to understand that objects can 
resemble each other and that appearances can vary from real-
ity. Prior to setting the task, the examiner asks each partici-
pant about the names of their two best friends. Real friends’ 
names are used in asking questions. A participant is pre-
sented with an object that he/she is asked to identify immedi-
ately; then, upon manipulating the object, it becomes clear 
that it is something else that only resembles the initially iden-
tified item. The participants are required to answer the fol-
lowing questions: a) “What does this object look like?”, b) 
“What is the object?”, c) “What do you expect your friend 
[the name of the participant’s first friend] would think if he 
saw this object?” 57. A successful answer to all three ques-
tions in three attempts indicates that the participant has 
adopted first-order theory of mind. For the purpose of this 
research, the applied tasks were modified and supplemented 
with questions which enable the assessment of second-order 
theory of mind ability. The examiner put additional question 
in order to assess “beliefs about beliefs”: d) “What do you 
expect your friend [the name of the participant’s first friend] 
to think about what someone else [the name of the partici-
pant’s second friend] thinks this object represents?”. For the 
purpose of this research, the participants were presented with 
three objects: a candle that looks like an apple, a box that 
looks like a book, and a bank that looks like a ladybird. Each 
correct answer was awarded one point, and incorrect zero. A 
successful answer to the fourth question in all three attempts 
indicates that second-order theory of mind has been adopted.  
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 58 was used to as-
sess the ability to comprehend speech, as a control variable. 
The items were grouped in 19 categories each consisting of 
12 words. The total number of words was 228. The original 
version of the instrument was translated into Serbian, and 
then the Serbian version was translated back into English. 
After minor changes made by comparing two versions of the 
test (the original and the translation), a final version was cre-
ated. The participants were expected to show one out of four 
given pictures, which corresponded to the uttered word. The 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test has a high internal consis-
tency ranging from 0.89 to 0.97 58. Electronic version of this 
test was used for the purpose of this research. The partici-
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pants were presented with pictures on a computer screen. 
The testing was stopped once a participant gave eight incor-
rect answers in one set. In accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the test authors and scoring instructions, raw score 
was obtained by subtracting the total number of incorrect an-
swers from the total number of given items. 
Raven’s progressive matrices 59 were used to determine 
the level of intellectual functioning. This instrument consists 
of non-verbal tasks designed to measure general intelligence 
factor. The tasks within this test are organized as patterns but 
always with one segment missing. Participants are expected 
to recognize the pattern rule and accordingly choose the 
missing one from several offered. The applied version of the 
matrices consisted of 60 tasks organized in five series. The 
tasks were arranged according to difficulty, and the series 
were organized according to topics: completing patterns, de-
termining analogies between pairs of figures, progressive 
changing of patterns, permuting figures and breaking the fig-
ures into parts. Reliability coefficient determined by even-
odd method was high and was 0.96, while test-retest reliabil-
ity was somewhat lower (0.88) 59. The test was assigned in-
dividually for the purpose of this research. It was shown and 
explained to the participant that there was one segment miss-
ing from the top of the page in each task, and that possible 
answers were given at the bottom of the page. It was also ex-
plained to the participant that each of the given answers was 
in a shape which could fit in the place of the missing seg-
ment, but that there was only one correct answer. Before 
starting the assessment, it was explained to the participant that 
he/she was expected to point to the answer he/she believed was 
the correct missing segment. After the introductory explanation 
of the task and a trial item, the examiner started the assessment 
starting from the first set and the first task. The examiner wrote 
down the answers which the participant pointed. All participants 
solved this test in less than 30 minutes. Raw score was calcu-
lated by adding up all the correct answers.  
Ethical notes 
All of the participants voluntarily participated in the re-
search. The informed consent to participate in the research 
was obtained for each of the participants or by their parents 
or guardians. The participants were informed about the na-
ture and content of the applied instruments and about the 
possibility of withdrawing from the procedure at any time. 
Additionally, the participants and their guardians were aware 
that the obtained results would be used solely for scientific 
purposes and that the confidentiality of any information ob-
tained would be respected. The research was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Special Education and 
Rehabilitation, University of Belgrade, Serbia.  
Procedure 
The assessment was conducted after the sample was 
formed and written consent was obtained from the participants 
and their guardians. The participants with ID and DD were in-
terviewed in their social care institutions. After providing intro-
ductory explanations and familiarizing the participants with the 
nature of tasks, the examiner assessed the participants individu-
ally in a space without any distractions. Video tasks from the 
applied scales were presented on a laptop, after which each par-
ticipant was asked questions about the contents of the video. The 
video clips were 20 to 25 seconds long. 
Data analyses 
Descriptive data analysis included calculating the mean 
value, standard deviation (SD), and standard error of meas-
urement (SE). Two separate mixed three-factor analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to examine the differ-
ences between groups with regard to different factors. The 
Spearman’s correlation was used to assess the relationship 
between the abilities to comprehend and produce irony and 
deception, intellectual functioning and theory of mind. The 
Pearson’s correlation was used to determine the relation be-
tween the subscales for assessing the abilities to comprehend 
and produce irony and deception.  
Results 
Table 2 shows the participants’ scores on subscales that 
assess comprehension and production of irony and deception 
with regard to the presence of DD. 
For the purpose of examining the differences in achieve-
ments on comprehending and producing irony and deception 
tasks, two separate three-factor ANCOVAs were performed, 
with diagnosis (ID, DD) as between subject factor and iro-
ny/deception and comprehension/production as repeated factors 
(within subject). Speech comprehension ability presented as the 
Peabody test score was used as the covariate in the first analysis, 
while intelligence presented through score on Raven’s progres-




Participants’ scores on scales assessing the comprehension and production of irony and deception with regard to the 
presence of dual diagnoses (DD) 
Mean SD SE Parameters ID DD ID DD ID DD 
Comprehension of irony 5.37 4.20 1.93 2.08 0.25 0.27 
Comprehension of deception 6.97 7.65 4.06 3.55 0.52 0.46 
Production of irony 6.50 5.58 2.59 2.95 0.33 0.38 
Production of deception 8.82 7.30 3.43 3.84 0.44 0.49 
ID – intellectual disability; SD – standard deviation; SE – standard error of measurement. 
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Table 3  
Three-factor ANCOVA with Peabody test score as the covariate 
Parameters F p Partial ƞ2 
Comprehension/production 0.177 0.674 0.002 
Comprehension/production * Peabody test score 5.076 0.026 0.042 
Comprehension/production * ID/DD 1.578 0.212 0.013 
Irony/deception 16.981 0.000 0.127 
Irony/deception * Peabody test score 0.041 0.840 0.000 
Irony/deception * ID/DD 1.778 0.185 0.015 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception 0.475 0.492 0.004 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception * Peabody test score 0.043 0.836 0.000 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception * ID/DD 6.856 0.010 0.055 
Peabody test score 58.959 0.000 0.335 
ID/DD 0.722 0.397 0.006 
ƞ2 – eta squared; ANCOVA – intellectual disability; DD – dual diagnoses. 
 
 
Table 4  
Three-factor analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with score on Raven’s progressive matrices as the covariate 
Parameters F p Partial ƞ2 
Comprehension/production 0.417 0.520 0.004 
Comprehension/production * score on Raven’s progressive matrices 3.562 0.062 0.030 
Comprehension/production * ID/DD 2.232 0.138 0.019 
Irony/deception 12.181 0.001 0.094 
Irony/deception * score on Raven’s progressive matrices 0.169 0.682 0.001 
Irony/deception * ID/DD 1.604 0.208 0.014 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception 0.795 0.374 0.007 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception * score on Raven’s progressive matrices 0.311 0.578 0.003 
Comprehension/production * irony/deception * ID/DD 6.940 0.010 0.056 
Score on Raven’s progressive matrices 10.657 0.001 0.083 
ID/DD 2.728 0.101 0.023 
ƞ2 – eta squared; ID – intellectual disability; DD – dual diagnoses. 
 
 
In the analysis in which speech comprehension ability 
was used as the covariate, only main effects of the covariate 
(speech comprehension) and irony/deception factor appeared 
as significant (Table 3). Apart from that, the analysis re-
vealed significant interactions of speech comprehension abil-
ity with comprehension/production, as well as the interaction 
of all three factors, comprehension/production, irony/decep-
tion and ID/DD. The interaction showed that effects of all 
three factors depended on each other; for instance, effects of 
irony/deception differed in comprehension and production, 
and also in ID and DD participants. 
In the analysis in which intellectual functioning was 
used as the covariate, only main effects of the covariate (in-
tellectual functioning) and irony/deception factor appeared as 
significant (Table 4). Apart from that, the analysis revealed 
significant interactions of all three factors, comprehen-
sion/production, irony/deception and ID/DD. The interaction 
showed that effects of all three factors depended on each 
other; for instance, effects of comprehension/production 
were different for irony and deception, and also in ID and 
DD participants. 
Participants with ID were better in producing irony than 
in comprehending it in both analyses (comprehending speech 
covariate p = 0.003; intellectual functioning covariate p = 
0.002), as well as in producing deception than in compre-
hending it (comprehending speech covariate p = 0.010; intel-
lectual functioning covariate p = 0.007). DD group was bet-
ter in producing irony than in comprehending it (p = 0.000 in 
both analyses), while there were no statistical differences in 
deception tasks; ID group had higher scores compared to DD 
group for comprehension of irony (comprehending speech 
covariate p = 0.016; intellectual functioning covariate p = 
0.004) and for production of deception only in the second 
analysis in which the covariate was intellectual functioning 
(p = 0.044).  
With regard to achievements in first-order theory of 
mind assessment tasks, we could conclude on the basis of 
mean values that participants with ID (M = 0.31, SD = 
0.469) had somewhat higher achievements than participants 
with DD (M = 0.26, SD = 445), but not statistically signifi-
cant (t[118] = 0.598, p = 0.234). A similar relation was pre-
sent in second-order theory of mind tasks in participants with 
ID (M = 0.15, SD = 0.360) and DD (M = 0.13, SD = 0.345) 
(t[117] = 0.223, p = 0.657). Nonparametric techniques of the 
Spearman’s rank correlation were used to assess the relations 
between first- and second-order theory of mind. Statistically 
significant correlations were obtained both in persons with 
ID (r = 0.617, p = 0.000) and in persons with DD (r = 0.649, 
p = 0.000). 
The Pearson’s correlation was used to determine the re-
lation between individual subscales for assessing the abilities 
to comprehend and produce irony and deception.  
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Table 5 
Correlations between comprehension and production of irony and deceptiona 







Comprehension of irony r α = 0.672 0.120 0.359** 0.302*
Comprehension of deception r 0.163 α = 0.891 -0.021 0.130
Production of irony r 0.507** 0.125  α = 0.800 0.576**
Production of deception r 0.406** 0.059 0.598** α = 0.885 
a Above diagonal – correlations for intellectual disability; below diagonal – correlations for dual diagnoses; on diagonal – 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for linguistic production and comprehending irony and deception subscales;  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 6  
Correlations among comprehension and production of irony and deception, theory of mind intellectual functioning, 
and speech comprehension 
Raven’s score TOM I TOM II Speech comprehension Parameters  
ID DD ID DD ID DD ID DD 
Comprehension of irony rs 0.137 0.306* 0.223 0.097 0.146 -0.022 0.433** 0.459** 
Comprehension of deception rs -0.006 0.069 -0.052 0.127 0.145 0.040 0.203 0.235 
Production of irony rs 0.208 0.426** 0.341** 0.114 0.263** 0.055 0.521** 0.532** 
Production of deception rs 0.163 0.319* 0.222 0.079 0.312* 0.051 0.527** 0.305* 
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ID – intellectual disability; DD – dual diagnoses; TOM I – first-order theory of mind;  
TOM II – second-order theory of mind. 
 
 
The obtained results showed irony comprehension cor-
related positively with irony production and deception pro-
duction, in both groups (ID and DD), but in DD the correla-
tions were a bit higher. Also, irony production correlated po-
sitively with deception production in both groups quite simi-
larly. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients showed satisfactory reli-
ability for almost all scales except for irony comprehension 
which was a bit lower (Table 5). 
The relationship between first- and second-order theory 
of mind ability and the production and comprehension of 
irony and deception was assessed using nonparametric tech-
niques of the Spearman’s rank correlation, since preliminary 
analyses determined that there was no normal distribution in 
theory of mind results. By means of the same technique, we 
tested the relations among speech comprehension ability, 
success in comprehending and producing irony and decep-
tion, and the level of intellectual functioning presented as the 
score on Raven’s progressive matrices (Table 6).  
There were no significant correlations between intellectual 
functioning and comprehension and production of irony and de-
ception in the group of participants with ID, while in the group 
with DD significant correlations were determined between intel-
lectual functioning and comprehending irony, producing irony 
and producing deception. In participants with ID, first-order the-
ory of mind had significant correlations only with producing 
irony, while second-order theory of mind had significant corre-
lations with producing irony and producing deception. In par-
ticipants with DD, there were no significant correlations be-
tween theory of mind and producing and comprehending irony 
and deception. With regard to speech comprehension ability, 
statistically significant correlations were determined in both 
groups of participants (ID and DD) with all subscales except 
with comprehending deception subscale. 
Discussion 
The obtained results showed that participants with ID 
were significantly more successful in comprehending irony 
tasks compared to participants with DD. Apart from compre-
hending irony, participants with ID were also more success-
ful in producing deception. All participants were more suc-
cessful in deception tasks compared to irony tasks. Produc-
tion was easier for all participants, except for participants 
with DD in deception tasks. 
Regarding differences between the participants with 
DD and the participants with ID, after using speech compre-
hension and intelligence as covariates, the ability to compre-
hend irony was singled out in both analyses indicating the 
existence of significant differences at an advantage of per-
sons with ID. Colle et al. 60 note that participants with psy-
chotic disorders and average intellectual abilities show more 
prominent difficulties with solving irony tasks. Gavilán and 
García-Albea 61 also indicate that in participants with symp-
toms of schizophrenia, the ability to comprehend figurative 
aspects of language (e.g. metaphor, irony, proverbs) is more 
strongly influenced by theory of mind ability than by intelli-
gence. Although according to these authors, theory of mind def-
icit has a negative influence on semantic-pragmatic processing 
and on comprehending figurative meaning, bearing in mind the 
absence of statistically significant correlations (which will be in-
terpreted with caution due to reduced variability of the variables 
which were correlated) between theory of mind and irony ob-
tained in this research, we are closer to the opinion of the au-
thors who argue that the theory of mind could not be considered 
a crucial factor in irony comprehension 4, 62. 
The following notions also indicate that the relation be-
tween theory of mind and comprehending irony in persons 
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with mental disorders depends on several different factors. In 
line with the above mentioned, some studies have found that, 
in persons with schizophrenia who do not have acute symp-
toms, comprehension of irony is not significantly related to 
the theory of mind 14, 63, which is in accordance with the re-
sults of this research. Some authors believe that the absence 
of relation between the theory of mind and comprehension of 
irony can be explained by the fact that persons with schizo-
phrenia may have deficits in implementation and execution, 
i.e. that they understand mental states of others, but they fail 
to apply this knowledge due to limitations related to process-
ing (e.g. general cognitive deficit) 14.  
Some authors believe that cognitive flexibility, the inte-
gration of different contextual elements, and the ability to re-
ject literal interpretations and make connections between a 
statement and a totally opposite meaning are necessary to 
comprehend irony 64. All of the mentioned factors (theory of 
mind and other cognitive factors) are in accordance with the 
ideas stated in the Theory of Cognitive Pragmatics, which 
indicate that irony is a non-standard form of communication 
in which it is not enough for the listener to follow the usual 
chain of communication; instead, he or she must flexibly ob-
serve both contextual segments and the speaker’s mental 
state. In this regard, the participants with DD in our research 
had somewhat more noticeable difficulties detecting discrep-
ancies in meaning and/or uttered messages whose meanings 
were in opposition to the contextual background and the 
speaker’s intention, which may point to the fact that the cha-
racteristics attributed to these participants – such as cognitive 
disorientation, poor analytic abilities, and insufficient moti-
vation, can contribute to such results. This assumption is in 
accordance with the results of the research conducted by 
Colle et al. 60 which indicate that severity of schizophrenic 
symptoms have a negative correlation with overall pragmatic 
abilities of persons with schizophrenia. 
Apart from differences in the ability to comprehend irony, the 
results of the mixed three-factor ANCOVA analysis, in which the 
covariate was intellectual functioning, indicate another difference 
between participants with ID and DD in producing deception tasks, 
again at an advantage of persons with ID.  
On the other hand, the results show that all participants 
were more successful in deception tasks compared to irony tasks 
regardless of the presence of ID and DD. The fact that all par-
ticipants were more successful in deception tasks is not surpris-
ing, and is supported by the literature which states that tasks 
containing irony are more demanding and more complex than 
tasks containing deception, both for participants with ID 65, and 
for typically developing individuals 4. Also, the results of this re-
search indicate that all participants with ID were more success-
ful in production tasks than in comprehending ironic and false 
statements. Persons with DD had higher scores in producing 
irony than in comprehending it. Bearing in mind that the ob-
tained results indicate that speech comprehension ability had 
significant interactions with the comprehension/production fac-
tor (p = 0.026, Partial ƞ2 = 0.042), the obtained differences be-
tween comprehending and producing irony and deception can 
also be observed in the context of the relation between this vari-
able and receptive speech. We can conclude that better under-
standing of speech leads to more pronounced differences be-
tween comprehension and production. 
The results of our research indicate that TOM did not 
correlate with comprehending and producing irony and de-
ception in participants with DD at all, while in participants 
with ID, first-order TOM correlated with producing irony, 
and second-order TOM correlated with producing irony and 
producing deception. It is possible that the absence of corre-
lations was caused by the limited variability (range restric-
tion) in both TOM and comprehending/producing irony/de-
ception (although the restriction appears to be larger for TOM). 
This finding which points to the relation between TOM and 
production is not uncommon in studies on other clinical popula-
tions, and thus Bosco et al. 66 indicate that in participants with 
traumatic brain injury TOM can account for the production of 
irony and deception to some extent, but not their comprehen-
sion. Executive functions were singled out as significant for 
speech comprehension, but not for production ability.  
Achievements of participants with ID and DD in irony 
and deception tasks with regard to their comprehension and 
production can be explained by speech comprehension abil-
ity (Partial ƞ2 = 0.335) to a greater extent than by intellectual 
functioning (Partial ƞ2 = 0.083). Supporters of linguistic 
theories of non-literal comprehension development also point 
out the significant influence of general linguistic comprehen-
sion and scope of vocabulary for comprehending non-literal 
language in persons with language difficulties67,68. Language 
skills have also proved to be crucial in comprehending ironic 
statements in studies on typically developing children 69. Nor-
bury 68 emphasizes that it cannot be argued that TOM fails to 
play any role in persons with language difficulties in compre-
hending non-literal language, not because of the theory of mind 
itself, but because of its close relation to language skills which 
are considered dominant in non-literal language. 
The ability of producing and comprehending both irony 
and deception in persons with ID cannot solely be explained 
by the presence of mental disorders, since it appeared as sig-
nificant only in interaction with other factors. Presence of 
mental disorders showed significant effect only on irony 
comprehension and deception production, which were higher 
in the group without mental disorders. Furthermore, the re-
sults of our research also point to the complexity of this rela-
tion, indicating that skills of producing and comprehending 
irony are significantly positively correlated with each other, 
and correlations were also determined with producing decep-
tion. Only comprehending deception did not correlate with 
other skills in any group. Partial absence of correlations be-
tween comprehending deception and irony can also be ob-
served as a part of differences between these skills and their 
partially different neurological basis. For example, in a neu-
roimaging study, Bosco et al. 70 found that the left middle 
temporal gyrus activated in comprehending ironic state-
ments, while it did not activate in comprehending lies. 
Limitations 
One of the limitations of this research is the use of only 
one instrument to assess the production and comprehension 
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of irony and deception, which did not allow a comparison of 
the results among instruments measuring the same group of 
abilities. A second limitation could be the sample structure of 
this research. Thus, future studies should extend the scope 
and structure of the assessed groups with regard to age and 
different intellectual disabilities aetiologies. Also, one of the 
limitations of this study may be the absence of assessment of 
certain aspects of executive functions (e.g. planning skills, 
reasoning skills, cognitive flexibility, etc.), which can poten-
tially be related to non-standard linguistic abilities. Addition-
ally, further studies should include the assessment of other 
cognitive and adaptive factors that influence the differences 
in non-standard achievements between participants with in-
tellectual disabilities and those with dual diagnoses. 
Conclusion 
Although differences were found in some aspects of 
assessed abilities between the two groups (participants 
with intellectual disability were better than participants 
with dual diagnoses in comprehension of irony and pro-
duction of deception), similarities in the profile of these 
abilities were dominant in all participants (both groups 
were better in comprehending and producing deception 
than irony). Examining the relations indicated that results 
variability can be explained by differences in speech 
comprehension ability more than by differences in non-




This paper is a result of the project “Social Participation 
of People with Intellectual Disability”, which was financed 
by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological 
Development of the Republic of Serbia (No. 179017). 
 
R E F E R E N C E S
1. Airenti G, Bara BG, Colombetti M. Conversation and behavior 
games in the pragmatics of dialogue. Cog Sci 1993; 17(2): 197–256. 
2. Bosco FM, Angeleri R, Sacco K, Bara BG. Explaining pragmatic 
performance in traumatic brain injury: a process perspective 
on communicative errors. Int J Lang Commun Disord 2015; 
50(1): 63–83.  
3. Bara B, Bosco F, Bucciarelli M. Developmental pragmatics in 
normal and abnormal children. Brain Lang 1999; 68(3): 507–28. 
4. Bosco F, Bucciarelli M. Simple and complex deceits and ironies. J 
Pragmat 2008; 40(4): 583–607. 
5. Bara B. Cognitive pragmatics: The mental processes of com-
munication. Intercult Pragmat 2011; 8(3): 443–85.  
6. Sacco K, Angeleri R, Bosco FM, Colle L, Mate D, Bara BG. As-
sessment Battery for Communication – ABaCo: A new in-
strument for the evaluation of pragmatic abilities. J Cogn Sci 
2008; 9(2): 111–57. 
7. Sperber D, Wilson D. Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. 
Mind Lang 2002; 17: 3–23. 
8. Bell EM, Langdon R, Siegert RJ, Ellis PE. Schizophrenia and so-
cial functioning: The role of impaired metacognition. In: Di-
maggio G, Lysaker P, editors. Metacognition and severe adult 
mental disorders: From research to treatment. London, UK: 
Routledge; 2010. p. 121–45.  
9. Bosco FM, Bono A, Bara BG. Recognition and repair of com-
municative failures: The interaction between theory of mind 
and cognitive complexity in schizophrenic patients. J Commun 
Disord 2012; 45(3): 181–97. 
10. Baron-Cohen S. Theory of mind and autism: a fifteen year re-
view. In: Baron-Cohen S, Tager-Flusberg H, Cohen DJ, editors. 
Understanding Other Minds – perspectives from developmen-
tal cognitive neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2000. p. 3–20. 
11. Happé FG. Communicative competence and theory of mind in 
autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition 1993; 48(2): 101–19. 
12. Massaro D, Valle A, Marchetti A. Irony and second-order false 
belief in children: What changes when mothers rather than sib-
lings speak? Eur J Dev Psychol 2013; 10(3): 301–17. 
13.  Monetta L, Grindrod CM, Pell MD. Irony comprehension and 
theory of mind deficits in patients with Parkinson's disease. 
Cortex 2009; 45(8): 972–81. 
14. Mo S, Su Y, Chan RC, Liu J. Comprehension of metaphor and 
irony in schizophrenia during remission: The role of theory of 
mind and IQ. Psychiatry Res 2008; 157(1–3): 21–9. 
15. Angeleri R, Airenti G. The development of joke and irony un-
derstanding: A study with 3-to 6-year-old children. Can J Exp 
Psychol 2014; 68(2): 133–46. 
16. Bosco FM, Angeleri R, Colle L, Sacco K, Bara BG. Communicative 
abilities in children: An assessment through different phenom-
ena and expressive means. J Child Lang 2013; 40(4): 741–78. 
17. Bosco FM, Vallana M, Bucciarelli M. Comprehension of commu-
nicative intentions: the case of figurative language. J Cogn Sci 
2009; 10(2): 245–77. 
18. Hancock JT. Verbal irony use in face-to-face and computer-
mediated conversations.  J Lang Soc Psychol 2004; 23(4): 447–63. 
19. Hancock JT, Dunham PJ, Purdy K. Children's comprehension of 
critical and complimentary forms of verbal irony. J Cogn Dev 
2000; 1(2): 227–48. 
20. Kreuz RJ. The production and processing of verbal irony. Me-
taphor Symb 2000; 15(1–2): 99–107. 
21. Milosky LM, Ford JA. The role of prosody in children's infer-
ences of ironic intent. Discourse Process 1997; 23(1): 47–61. 
22. Recchia HE, Howe N, Ross HS, Alexander S. Children's under-
standing and production of verbal irony in family conversa-
tions. Br J Dev Psychol 2010; 28(Pt 2): 255–74. 
23. Dennis M, Purvis K, Barnes MA, Wilkinson M, Winner E. Under-
standing of literal truth, ironic criticism, and deceptive praise 
following childhood head injury. Brain Lang 2001; 78(1): 1–16. 
24. Wang AT, Lee SS, Sigman M, Dapretto M. Neural basis of irony 
comprehension in children with autism: the role of prosody 
and context. Brain 2006; 129(Pt 4): 932–43. 
25. Caillies S, Hody A, Calmus A. Theory of mind and irony com-
prehension in children with cerebral palsy. Res Dev Disabil 
2012; 33(5): 1380–8. 
26. Caillies S, Bertot V, Motte J, Raynaud C, Abely M. Social cognition 
in ADHD: irony understanding and recursive theory of mind. 
Res Dev Disabil 2014; 35(11): 3191–8. 
27. American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Dis-
abilities (AAIDD). Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classifi-
cation, and Systems of Supports. 11th ed. Washington, DC: 
AAIDD; 2010. 
Vol. 77, No 6 VOJNOSANITETSKI PREGLED Page 629 
Djordjević M, et al. Vojnosanit Pregl 2020; 77(6): 620–630. 
28. Glumbić N. Quality of social participation of children with 
moderate mental retardation. Socijalna misao 2005; 12(2–3): 
143–54. (Serbian) 
29. Angell ME, Bailey RL, Larson L. Systematic instruction for so-
cial-pragmatic language skills in lunchroom settings. Educ 
Train Dev Disabil 2008; 43(3): 342–59. 
30. Cooper SA, Smiley E, Morrison J, Williamson A, Allan L. Mental 
ill-health in adults with intellectual disabilities: prevalence and 
associated factors. Br J Psychiatry 2007; 190: 27–35. 
31. Dekker MC, Koot HM. DSM-IV disorders in children with bor-
derline to moderate intellectual disability. I: Prevalence and 
impact. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 2003; 42(8): 915–22. 
32. Emerson E. Prevalence of psychiatric disorders in children and 
adolescents with and without intellectual disability. J Intellect 
Disabil Res 2003; 47(Pt 1): 51–8. 
33. Cormack KF, Brown AC, Hastings RP. Behavioural and emo-
tional difficulties in students attending schools for children 
and adolescents with severe intellectual disability. J Intellect 
Disabil Res 2000; 44(Pt 2): 124–9. 
34. Einfeld S, Tonge BJ. Population prevalence of psychopathology 
in children and adolescents with intellectual disability. I. Rationale 
and methods. J Intellect Disabil Res 1996; 40(Pt 2): 91–8. 
35. Einfeld SL, Ellis LA, Emerson E. Comorbidity of intellectual 
disability and mental disorder in children and adolescents: A 
systematic review. J Intellect Dev Disabil 2011; 36(2): 137–43. 
36. Molteno G, Molteno CD, Finchilescu G, Dawes AR. Behavioural 
and emotional problems in children with intellectual disability 
attending special schools in Cape Town, South Africa. J Intel-
lect Disabil Res 2001; 45(Pt 6): 515–20. 
37. Horovitz M, Matson JL, Sipes M, Shoemaker M, Belva B, Bamburg 
JW. Incidence and trends in psychopathology symptoms over 
time in adults with severe to profound intellectual disability. 
Res Dev Disabil 2011; 32(2): 685–92. 
38. LoVullo SV, Matson JL. Comorbid psychopathology in adults 
with autism spectrum disorders and intellectual disabilities. Res 
Dev Disabil 2009; 30(6): 1288–96. 
39. Bakken TL, Eilertsen DE, Smeby NA, Martinsen H. Effective 
communication related to psychotic disorganised behaviour in 
adults with intellectual disability and autism. Nord J Nurs Res 
Clin Stud 2008; 28(2): 9–13. 
40. Matson JL, Anderson SJ, Bamburg JW. The relationship of social 
skills to psychopathology for individuals with mild and moder-
ate mental retardation. Br J Dev Disabil 2000; 46(90): 15–22. 
41. Matson JL, Terlonge C, González ML, Rivet T. An evaluation of 
social and adaptive skills in adults with bipolar disorder and 
severe/profound intellectual disability. Res Dev Disabil 2006; 
27(6): 681–7. 
42. Bakken TL, Friis SV, Lovoll SV, Smeby NA, Martinsen H. Be-
havioral disorganization as an indicator of psychosis in adults 
with intellectual disability and autism. Ment Health Aspect 
Dev Disabil 2007; 10(2): 37–47. 
43. Cherry KE, Penn D, Matson JL, Bamburg JW. Characteristics of 
schizophrenia among persons with severe or profound mental 
retardation. Psychiatr Serv 2000; 51(7): 922–4. 
44. Charman T, Campbell A, Edwards L. Theory of mind perform-
ance in children, adolescents and adults with a mental handi-
cap. Cognit Dev 1998; 13(3): 307–22. 
45. Kravetz S, Katz S, Alfa-Roller I, Yehoshua S. Aspects of a Theory 
of Mind and self-reports of quality of life by persons with 
mental retardation. J Dev Phys Disabil 2003; 15(2): 165–83. 
46. Giaouri S, Alevriadou A, Tsakiridou E. Theory of mind abilities 
in children with Down syndrome and non-specific intellectual 
disabilities: An empirical study with some educational implica-
tions. Procedia Soc Behav Sci 2010; 2(2): 3883–7. 
47. Lo ST, Siemensma E, Collin P, Hokken-Koelega A. Impaired the-
ory of mind and symptoms of autism spectrum disorder in 
children with Prader–Willi syndrome. Res Dev Disabil 2013; 
34(9): 2764–73. 
48. Bora E, Yucel M, Pantelis C. Theory of mind impairment in 
schizophrenia: meta-analysis. Schizophr Res 2009; 109(1–3): 
1–9. 
49. Brüne M. “Theory of mind” in schizophrenia: a review of the 
literature. Schizophr Bull 2005; 31(1): 21–42. 
50. Corcoran R, Mercer G, Frith CD. Schizophrenia, symptomatology 
and social inference: investigating “theory of mind” in people 
with schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1995; 17(1): 5–13. 
51. Sprong M, Schothorst P, Vos E, Hox J, van Engeland H. Theory of 
mind in schizophrenia: meta-analysis. Br J Psychiatry 2007; 
191(1): 5–13. 
52. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders. 5th ed. Arlington: American Psychiatric 
Publishing; 2013. 
53. Filippova E, Astington JW. Further development in social rea-
soning revealed in discourse irony understanding. Child Dev 
2008; 79(1): 126–38. 
54. Zhou L, Burgoon JK, Zhang D, Nunamaker JF. Language domi-
nance in interpersonal deception in computer-mediated com-
munication. Comput Human Behav 2004; 20(3): 381–402. 
55. Farrar MJ, Maag L. Early language development and the emer-
gence of a theory of mind. First Lang 2002; 22(2): 197–213. 
56. Fisher N, Happé F, Dunn J. The relationship between vocabu-
lary, grammar, and false belief task performance in children 
with autistic spectrum disorders and children with moderate 
learning difficulties. J Child Psychol Psychiatry 2005; 46(4): 
409–19. 
57. Hansen MB, Markman EM. Appearance questions can be mis-
leading: a discourse-based account of the appearance–reality 
problem. Cogn Psychol 2005; 50(3): 233–63. 
58. Dunn LM, Dunn DM. PPVT-4: Peabody picture vocabulary 
test. 4th ed. Minneapolis, MN: Pearson Assessments; 2007. 
59. Raven J, Raven JC, Court, JH. Manual for Raven’s progressive 
matrices and vocabulary scales. SOxford: Oxford Psycholo-
gists Press; 1998. 
60. Colle L, Angeleri R, Vallana M, Sacco K, Bara BG, Bosco F. Un-
derstanding the communicative impairments in schizophrenia: 
A preliminary study. J Commun Dis 2013; 46(3): 294–308. 
61.  Gavilán Ibáñez JM, García-Albea Ristol JE. Theory of mind and 
language comprehension in schizophrenia: Poor mindreading 
affects figurative language comprehension beyond intelligence 
deficits. J Neurolinguistics 2011; 24(1): 54–69. 
62. Bosco FM, Gabbatore I. Theory of mind in recognizing and re-
covering communicative failures. Appl Psycholinguistics 2017; 
38(1): 57–88. 
63. Mitchley NJ, Barber J, Gray JM, Brooks DN, Livingston MG. Com-
prehension of irony in schizophrenia. Cogn Neuropsychiatry 
1998; 3(2): 127–38. 
64. Godbee K, Porter M. Comprehension of sarcasm, metaphor and 
simile in Williams syndrome. Int J Lang Commun Disord 
2013; 48(6): 651–65. 
65. Sullivan K, Winner E, Tager-Flusberg H. Can adolescents with 
Williams syndrome tell the difference between lies and jokes? 
Dev Neuropsychol 2003; 23(1–2): 85–103. 
66. Bosco FM, Parola A, Valentini MC, Morese R. Neural correlates 
underlying the comprehension of deceitful and ironic commu-
nicative intentions. Cortex 2017; 94: 73–86. 
67. Vance M, Wells B. The wrong end of the stick: language-
impaired children's understanding of non-literal language. 
Child Lang Teach Ther 1994; 10 (1): 23–46. 
68. Norbury CF. The relationship between theory of mind and me-
taphor: Evidence from children with language impairment and 
autistic spectrum disorder. Br J Dev Psychol 2005; 23(3): 383–99. 
Page 630 VOJNOSANITETSKI PREGLED Vol. 77, No 6 
Djordjević M, et al. Vojnosanit Pregl 2020; 77(6): 620–630. 
69. Filippova E, Astington JW. Further development in social rea-
soning revealed in discourse irony understanding. Child Dev 
2008; 79(1): 126–38. 
70. Bosco FM, Gabbatore I, Angeleri R, Zettin M, Parola A. Do execu-
tive function and theory of mind predict pragmatic abilities 
following traumatic brain injury? An analysis of sincere, deceit-
ful and ironic communicative acts. J Commun Disord 2018; 
75: 102–17. 
 
Received on February 14, 2018. 
Revised on June 28, 2018. 
Accepted on July 23, 2018. 
Online First September, 2018. 
 
